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RECENT DECISIONS

(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken
for an underlying obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer,
maker or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying obligor;
and
(b) in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto
until the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand
until its presentment. If the instrument is dishonored
action may be maintained on either the instrument or
the obligation; discharge of the underlying obligor on
13
the instrument also discharges him on the obligation.
In the field of conflicts between the "cash sale" and the "voidable
title" doctrines, the Uniform Commercial Code has adopted and clarified the "voidable title" doctrine. The Code has taken scrambled and
unreliable word formulas, and from these has promulgated several sections which should fit the needs of the commercial law dealing with
good faith purchasers for value and with questions arising between the
seller and buyer. The Code's desire to increase the marketability of
goods in the open market is readily apparent.
CHARLES

J. HARTZHEIM

Wills: Effect of Provision Designating Attorney for Executor:
In Estate of Sieben" the testator had designated both an executor and
an attorney for the executor. After admission of the will to probate and issuance of letters testamentary to the executor, the executor
having refused to retain the services of the named attorney, the latter
initiated the instant proceeding in the lower court by affidavit and order
to show cause why he should not be retained as attorney for the executor. The lower court upheld the designation and issued an order appointing the attorney, from which order the executor appealed. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that "in the
absence of a statement of intent in the will that a named attorney be
employed by the personal representative even at the cost of the resignation of the personal representative, an executor is not required to employ an attorney in opposition to the executor's own wishes."12 Although
the court did not uphold this testamentary designation of the attorney,
the implication of the language quoted above is that where there was an
adequate expression of an intention that the named attorney be retained
even at the cost of the resignation of the executor, the designation
would be upheld. 3
3

§ 3-802.
2id. at 170, 128 N.W. 2d at 445.

'1UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

124 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W. 2d 443 (1964).
3See

EcKHARDT, WORKBOOK FOR WIscoNsIN ESTATE PLANNERS § 3(D) (0.2)
(1961), for a suggested clause conditioning appointment of the executor on
his retaining the services of a designated attorney.
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The implication is not novel nor should the decision have been unexpected. In Estate of Braasch,4 involving a fact situation similar to
the principal case, Justice Fairchild concluded that the intent of the
testator was that the executor should serve even though he refused to
retain the named attorney. This conclusion was one of the determining
factors in the court's refusal to uphold the attorney designation there.
As a determining factor, it necessarily gives rise to the same implication
more patently illustrated by the principal case.
The above two cases, along with Estate of Ogg,5 establish Wisconsin as one of two states which, in appropriate fact situations, enforce testamentary designation of an attorney.6 However, an examination of these cases reveals a question not yet adequately considered by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. By what right does the designated attorney bring an action against an executor to enforce the testamentary
designation? Because nearly all other jurisdictions refuse to enforce the
testamentary designation of an attorney, it is necessary to resort to
cases involving testamentary designations of persons to perform other
types of services in an attempt to discover why such persons can enforce the designation.
In Shaw v. Lawless,7 the testator had devised lands to defendant
Shaw with direction to employ Lawless in the receipt and management
thereof, "he having acted for me since I became possessed of said
estate fully to my satisfaction," Lawless contended that the will created a trust in his favor." In refuting this contention, the court employed this analogy:
[I]f a testator should say that he desired his son to be educated
at a particular school, that would create a trust in favour of the
schoolmaster? That would certainly be a matter for the advantage
of the schoolmaster, but it could not be contended that he would
have a right to enforce the performance of this desire of the
testator. It would be an expression of desire made for the benefit not of the master but of the scholar. 9
It was held that no trust was created, since the testator did not intend
to create an interest for the benefit of Lawless. Absent such an interest,
the designee had no cause of action.
4274 Wis. 569, 80 N.W. 2d 759 (1957).
5262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W. 2d 175 (1952).
6 The majority view is that a testamentary direction to employ a named attorney is unenforceable. Wisconsin and Louisiana are opposed. ScoTT, TRUSTS
§ 126.3 (2d ed. 1956).
7 5 Cl. & Fin. 129, 7 E.R. 353 (1838).
8 Two earlier decisions had upheld similar testamentary directiong where the
designated person was to be employed by the trustees of an express trust
created in the will, the designee being considered one of the trust beneficiaries. Hibbert v. Hibbert, 3 Mer. 681, 36 E.R. 261 (1808); Williams v. Corbet,
8 Sim. 349, 59 E.R. 138 (1837).
9 7 E.R. at 362.
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Professor Scott,' 0 in discussing testamentary trusts involving a direction that the trustees employ a designated person, establishes three
categories of intent which might prompt such a direction. The direction
could have been made (1) for the sole benefit of the designated person,
(2) for the mutual benefit of the designated person and the cestui que
trust, or (3) for the sole benefit of the cestui que trust." Where the
direction was made at least in part for the benefit of the designated
person, he may be considered a beneficiary under the trust and thereby
have an enforceable right. However, Scott states that where the direction to employ is for the sole benefit of the cestui que trust, "the designated person, although he might benefit by the employment, is not a
beneficiary of the trust and has no standing to compel the trustee to
employ him."' 2
There is no compelling reason for limiting the above discussion to
persons designated for employment under an express trust created by
will. The important consideration is the testator's intent in inserting the
testamentary direction to employ. The discussion would thus appear to
be applicable to situations paralleling that in the principal case; that is,
where a testator directs his executor to retain the services of a designated attorney. We also have the same parallel situation in the Shaw
case and in the example of the schoolmaster. If these tests were applied
to the problem of whether the attorney has a right to enforce his designation as attorney for the executor, language of the sort used in the
will in the principal case- in view of [his] complete familiarity with
my estate and financial affairs" 1 3 -is likely to be insufficient to create
an enforceable right in the attorney, as it expresses only an intent to
benefit the estate.
However, in Wisconsin we find some support for the proposition
that the attorney so designated in the will takes a beneficial interest
under the will. In Estate of Ogg,' 4 the attorney designated in the will
to serve as attorney for the administrator with the will annexed petitioned the court for appointment. The lower court dismissed the petition and the attorney appealed. On appeal, respondent contended that
the attorney was not a party aggrieved and therefore had no right to
appeal the decision of the trial court. The supreme court, in holding the
petitioner to be an aggrieved party, quoted with approval the following:
A party is aggrieved if he would have had the thing if the erroneous judgment had not been given. Or... whenever it operates
Dane Professor of Law Emeritus at Harvard University and reporter on
trusts for the American Law Institute.
"xScott, Testamentary Directions to Employ, 41 HARV. L. REV. 709, 712 (1928).

10

12

Ibid.

Estate of Sieben, supra note 1, at 167, 128 N.
suggested by ECxHARDT, op. cit. supra note 3.
14 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W. 2d 175 (1952).

13

. 2d at 444; cf. the language
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on his rights of property or bears directly upon his interest. A
broader.., definition is that an aggrieved party.., is one having
an interest recognized by law in the subject matter which is injuriously affected by the judgment. 15 (Emphasis added.)
To be aggrieved the party must have an interest in the subject matter,
and to hold that the attorney was aggrieved was to hold that he had an
interest taken by reason of his designation in the will. A former Wisconsin probate judge 6 has interpreted the Ogg case to mean that since
an attorney designated in the will is an interested party with a right of
appeal, he must be listed in the petition for probate of the will. 17 Per-

sons who must be listed in the petition for probate of the will include
"legatees and devisees" plus any surviving spouse and heirs not named
as beneficiaries in the will.' s
This classifies the attorney as a beneficiary, and, in the event of a
will contest, problems could arise under section 238.08 of the Wisconsin statutes 9 since it is common practice in Wisconsin for an attorney
drafting a will to sign as one of the witnesses. 20 In an Illinois case,
Estate of George,2 the attorney designated in the will was retained by
the executor. An action was commenced by the beneficiaries for disallowance of the fee paid to the attorney for his work. Under the Illinois
22
statutes,
if any beneficial interest is given in a will to a person attesting its execution, the interest is void as to that beneficiary.2 3 Here the
attorney was one of the attesting witnesses, and it was held that he
could not receive any financial remuneration for his services since his
2
designation in the will constituted a beneficial interest under the will.

4

There may also be certain ethical considerations involved in an
'5

Id. at 192, 54 N.W. 2d at 180.
Decade of ProbateLaw, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 82, 101.

16 Kroncke, A
17 WIS. STAT.

§ 310.045(1) (1963) requires that "all petitions . . . show the
names ... of all persons interested .. " Other possible ramifications of considering the attorney as an interested party are that notice would probably
have to be given to the attorney under §§ 310.04 and 324.18 unless he was
retained, in which case he would be making a general appearance under
§ 324.18(3). Likewise, the attorney would probably have to consent to "waiver
of notice" under § 310.05(1), which he would be unlikely to do if not retained by the executor.
Is Wis. STAT. § 310.045(2)
(1963): "In a petition for probate of a will . ..
the legatees and devisees and the surviving spouse and heirs of the decedent
are persons interested."
19Section 238.08 reads as follows: "All beneficial devises, legacies, and gifts
whatsoever, made or given in any will to a subscribing witness thereto . . .
shall be wholly void unless there be two other competent subscribing witnesses to the same ......
2OThis facilitates proof of the will where there is no contest under § 310.06(1).
2' 111 1. App. 2d 359, 137 N.E. 2d 555 (1956).
22 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 195 (1953).
23 This is similar to § 238.08 of the Wisconsin statutes.
24 It should be noted that the interest of the attorney was considered to be
merely a contingent or uncertain interest, dependent upon the executor's
acquiesence in the testamentary direction. Illinois, like most jurisdictions,
note 6 supra, does not consider the executor bound by a direction to employ
the designated attorney.
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attorney taking this type of beneficial interest under the will. In State
v. Horan,25 the court mentions as some of the considerations involved,
the conflict of interests, the incompetence of an attorney-beneficiary to testify because of a transaction with the deceased (sec.
325.16, Stats.), the possible jeopardy of the will if its admission
to probate is contested, the possible harm done to other beneficiaries and the undermining of the public trust and confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession .... 11
In conclusion, in Wisconsin it appears that an attorney designated
in a will as attorney for the executor takes an enforceable interest by
reason of the designation if the executor's appointment is conditioned
upon retention of the designated attorney. As yet, the precise nature of
this interest has not been fully considered, nor have possible ramifications such as those discussed above. It would thus seem appropriate for
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to reconsider at the first opportunity
presented whether the attorney-designee should have a right to enforce
his designation; and if so, on what basis.
JOHN P. FOLEY
Evidence: Admissibility of a Doctor's Testimony as to His Patient's Subjective Symptoms: In Ritter v. Coca Cola Co.,' plaintiff
sued for psychological injuries that occurred when she drank a bottle
of Coca-Cola and discovered portions of a decomposed mouse inside.
Plaintiff retained counsel the next day and then consulted a doctor
concerning any possible physical injuries, but none were found. Upon
continuing emotional distress, she visited a psychiatrist and recounted
to him her symptoms of loss of sleep, fear of mice, and fear of nontranslucent liquids. At the trial, after the psychiatrist had testified in
her favor, plaintiff recovered $2,500 for the injuries incurred.
Defendant appealed the °trial court ruling admitting into evidence
the psychiatrist's testimony as to his patient's subjective symptoms.
Defendant contended that to allow this doctor to testify after plaintiff
retained counsel was in direct contravention of the court's previous3
2
holding in Kath v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. and other subsequent cases.
The supreme court affirmed, and expressly overruled the Kath case.
It has long been recognized as a valid exception to the hearsay rule,
that a doctor may testify as to subjective symptoms which are related
to him by his patient. It is asserted that declarations made by a person
to his physician while receiving treatment are trustworthy and should
Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W. 2d 488 (1961).
page 70, 123 N.W. 2d at 490.
124 Wis. 2d 157, 128 N.W. 2d 439 (1964).
2 121 Wis. 503, 99 N.W. 217 (1904).
3 See Thompson v. Nee, 12 Wis. 2d 326, 107 N.W. 2d 150 (1961) ; Plesko v. City
of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 120 N.W. 2d 130 (1963).

25 21

26 Id. at

